Developing countries with large greenhouse gas emissions play a decisive role in negotiating a post-Kyoto climate agreement. No effective program to reduce global emissions is possible without their support. At the same time, developing countries face a delicate task in balancing their growing responsibility for a livable climate with the pursuit of continued economic development. This article discusses the negotiating positions major developing country emitters are taking on core issues. Among the most vital unsettled questions are burden sharing between developed and developing countries, the role of the market in the international climate architecture, as well as implementation arrangements. An annex discusses current mitigation policies of major developing country emitters, and argues that developing countries are already taking meaningful action to limit the growth of their greenhouse gas emissions.
This second-track project complements other work on climate change and development such as Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA) and Forest Monitoring for Action (FORMA) by CGD senior fellow David Wheeler on a range of economic and information issues critical to minimizing the risks and costs to developing countries and the world's poor and near-poor of climate change. Such work has become a priority of the Center as those risks and costs have become more clear and compelling.
The paper provides a thorough and thoughtful survey of the current negotiating positions of such key countries as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa as of August 2009. Readers concerned and interested in the fate of the Copenhagen discussions will be dismayed and heartened, depending on the issue. To the extent the negotiating positions are just that, they may of course change; our website will provide periodic updates.
Introduction
Not much time remains until the Copenhagen meeting in December. Yet, many essential questions remain unresolved, and the schedule for formal and informal preparatory meetings over the next months is tight. It is generally expected that, as was the case with the Kyoto Protocol (KP), a deal will not be struck until the last minute.
All major emitters among developing countries 1 have put forth detailed negotiating positions (as have the EU, Japan, and the United States). This essay describes and discusses their views as they have been expressed publicly, without seeking to predict which elements of a position may be more negotiable than others. On each major issue, the essay first points out areas of agreement,
then analyzes key open questions.
International negotiations -state of play
Among the major developing country emitters, Brazil, China, and India have set out positions that are similar in many aspects, and could fairly be characterized as quite maximal. South Africa's is perhaps somewhat less aggressive in its emphasis on developed country action and financing.
Mexico and Korea (who, together with Switzerland, form a separate negotiating bloc, the Environmental Integrity Group) have articulated positions that strike more of a balance between what other developing countries have proposed, and where developed countries are aiming.
Indonesia's proposals often share common ground with Mexico's and Korea's. It may well be that the approach of these three countries will yield elements for an eventual compromise. The group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) has so far remained aligned with major developing country emitters throughout the negotiations, although their interests may be quite distinct.
Developing countries overall seek a tight long-term emission reduction goal, and expect steep and binding cuts from developed countries, including in the medium term. They reject taking on binding commitments in the first post-2012 commitment period (which is expected to last until 2020), although some will consider taking on soft caps or efficiency targets, and charting a way to binding commitments in the future. Strong financial and technological support for adaptation, as 1 In the climate negotiations, Parties generally refer to the group of countries included in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as 'developed' countries. Annex I countries include all OECD members with the exception of Korea and Mexico, as well as other high-income countries and most transition economies. By implication, 'developing countries' are Parties to the Convention not included in Annex I. This essay follows this terminology, using 'developed countries' and 'Annex I countries' interchangeably, unless it intends to draw a specific distinction between, e.g., countries in different income groups. Given emission reductions of at least 80% in developed countries, the IPCC argued that reaching 450ppm would in addition require developing countries to achieve a "substantial deviation from baseline emissions" by 2020. (Metz et al. 2007: 776) This has most commonly been quantified as (ii) Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) . In facilitating an effective contribution from major developing country emitters, MRV arrangements matter no less than the nature of NAMAs.
Economy-wide caps with weak MRV may be ineffective, while strong MRV may render even relatively soft commitments effective through accountability and financial incentives.
Core questions on MRV concern, firstly, whether MRV shall apply to whether developing countries undertake the actions they committed to, or to the impact of those actions. Secondly, there is dissent around whether MRV would be carried out by national authorities or an international body, and whether according to national or internationally agreed standards. Most developing countries argue that different regimes should apply to actions that receive international support and those that do not, and it seems likely that compromise might be possible along those lines. Advocates of this approach argue that it would reward countries that have maintained high forest cover, and grant low-income countries additional funds to limit deforestation. Thirdly, some developed countries have argued for projecting deforestation with a more complex model, since, as the EU puts it, the "reference emission level may need modification to reflect causal understanding of socio-economic factors that determine the rate of deforestation or forest degradation, rather than simply being set equal to the historical rate." Providing sufficient funds for reducing emission growth in developing countries is among the biggest unsettled issues on the agenda. Industrialized countries will most likely take on binding caps, and developing countries most likely will not. The key question for mitigation funding is then who pays for abatement in developing countries (the implementing country, or developed countries -whether through public funds or private carbon market transactions), and who receives credit for the reduction in emissions (the implementing country, or the one that pays).
Three scenarios (and mixtures between them) are possible. Firstly, (1) NAMAs could receive public funding from developed countries, with emission reductions credited to the implementing country. Alternatively, the system could expand the use of market mechanisms beyond the CDM process. With this option, (2a) NAMAs could receive (partial) public funding from developed countries, and reductions could be (partially) credited to the financing country as offsets; and/or (2b) NAMAs could generate certified offsets which could be sold in the private carbon market. In terms of burden sharing, the two latter mechanisms are a priori equivalent, since the market buyers would be private entities from developed countries that purchase credits to meet their domestic cap requirements. It would of course also be possible for ( The relative role in financing NAMAs of market mechanisms, public funds from industrialized countries, and developing countries' own resources will be a key negotiation issue. The Parties agreed in Poznan to retain the CDM mechanism, so there is no doubt that some market mechanism will still be in place under the new regime. Yet, the volume of the CDM is small compared to emission reduction needs, and the important question remains whether the market will be scaled up, through offset credits generated by NAMAs, or through some other version of programmatic and policy-based CDM.
Open questions hence remain as to (i) the scale and modalities of public funding from developed countries, and (ii) the use of offsets in meeting developed country commitments, and the role of private carbon markets. Mexico similarly considers that, if carbon credits were to be sold for action financed by its Green Fund, these credits would be "subject to discount rules … to ensure the environmental integrity of the scheme." In addition to maintaining environmental effectiveness, introducing discount factors might also preserve a stronger incentive for developed countries to lower emissions domestically:
from a developed country perspective, applying a discount factor is equivalent to raising the price of offsets relative to the price of domestic emission abatement. Disagreement over the use of offsets may be driven by genuine worries among developing countries that developed countries are not taking on sufficiently deep emission reduction commitments. In light of the relatively low emission cuts proposed by the United States and some other developed countries, this is a legitimate concern. In addition, major developing emitters may be concerned that selling today's emission credits generated from comparatively cheap mitigation action may leave them facing higher marginal cost in meeting commitments they may have to take on themselves post-2020. (Observers have called this the 'low hanging fruit' problem' of mitigation.) Yet, it may be in the interest of many developing countries, and LDCs in particular, to seek a compromise that would allow for a broader use of offsets in exchange for higher than expected developed country commitments -a trade-off that Indonesia and Mexico, 22 for instance, have suggested. Such a compromise might help promote core interest of LDCs, namely reducing future climate change impacts, preserving scarce international funds for adaptation expenses, and attracting investment for NAMAs.
(8) Institutional arrangements
Much work remains to be done in designing an institutional architecture to support action on climate change. Key areas of contention include (i) the governance of climate-related funds and carbon markets, as well as (ii) funding eligibility criteria and access modalities.
(i) The role of markets and multilateral funds. In essence, developing-country proposals for the institutional architecture either call for a UNFCCC-managed system of large public funds, or envisage a more decentralized market architecture with a smaller role for public funds. A reasonably high degree of consensus appears to be forming on the long-run target to limit warming, as well as on adaptation action. On many other key issues, both developing and developed countries have proposed compromise solutions that may well prove productive. These include, among others, taking a phased approach to action on forests, permitting limited use of (discounted) offsets in exchange for higher developed-country commitments, and limiting new bureaucracy in implementation arrangements while taking every effort to ensure that adaptation and mitigation programs are highly country-driven. All strategies reflect solid adaptation planning, with measures envisaged revolving chiefly around capacity building, but in most cases also comprising sectoral resilience programs in agriculture and coastal sectors, as well as insurance.
Mexico's and South Africa's strategies stand apart in being the only ones to chart in detail a trajectory for economy-wide emissions through peak levels to long-term stabilization levels.
Mexico has already committed to reducing its emissions to Brazil is a strong proponent of the 'polluter pays' principle, and regards per capita emissions in the historical aggregate as an appropriate metric. However, the country presents its own historical emissions net of the effect of LULUCF, which must be regarded as a less than transparent accounting practice.
China
The PRC's 2007 National Climate Change Program reflects genuine worry about the possible impact of climate change on China. Changes to the water cycle receive attention, and particular concern is felt about extreme weather events, which are thought to develop "immense impacts on the socio-economic development and people's living." (Government of China, 2007: 6) The
Program recognizes the near-doubling of China's emissions over the past two decades, but also highlights the 50% drop in emissions intensity of production over the period 1990-2004 (partly driven by sectoral shifts, but also by significant process efficiency improvements). Importantly, the discussion of the coal-dependency of China's economy is lucid, and there is a sense of urgency in avoiding the technological lock-in over the coming years.
The Program proposes a number of significant initiatives in the energy and industrial sector - Since the introduction of the Program, a steady flow of press reports has indicated that implementation is proceeding apace, with significant investments and administrative pressure. In several sectors, notably clean energy, efforts appear to have raced ahead of the planned pace.
India
The Government of India's 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change demonstrates concern about India's vulnerability, given that its "economy [is] closely tied to its natural resource base and climate-sensitive sectors". (Government of India 2008: 1) Still, it recognizes that "India has a wider spectrum of choice precisely because it is at an early stage of development," thus highlighting both the possibilities of technology leap-frogging and the perils of lock-in. India believes that equity in mitigation implies equal per capita shares of the global atmospheric commons. Hence, "India is determined that its per capita greenhouse gas emissions will at no point exceed that of developed countries." (2) This stance is consistent in principle with global convergence of emissions levels at ca. 2t CO 2 e p.c., as is required in order to avoid warming in excess of 2˚C. Implementing it effectively would likely have to imply India remaining significantly below developing country emissions to avoid overshooting.
India's Action Plan articulates a detailed and ambitious R&D agenda for green technologies.
Energy efficiency projects in industry and buildings offer major mitigation potential, with projected sectoral emissions reductions by 2030 of 16% and 30-40% below BAU, respectively.
(19, 23) The Action Plan reports on steps toward implementing these measures, including mandatory emissions audits in some industries, and a voluntary building efficiency code. It discusses options for ambitious future policies, including carbon taxes as well as emission intensity targets for large enterprises with a market for tradable permits. To date, South Africa has resolved to implement a suite of actions with net-negative cost. This includes an energy efficiency strategy, and a shift "away from coal-fired electricity, with renewables, nuclear and cleaner coal each providing 27% of electricity generated by 2050." Korea estimates that these shifts in energy generation will result in lowering energy consumption by 46% below BAU by 2030. (6) Korea plans to bring several policy tools to bear in pursuing these goals, including: in the industrial sector, financing for green energy technologies and clean processes, and a certification and transaction process for industry emission credits; support for new transport technologies; an expansion of energy efficient building requirements; and substantial investments in R&D, including nuclear safety. In addition to these actions, Korea intends to test a cap and trade system in 2011, and is preparing to announce an emission cap for 2020. (Yoon, 2009; Cho, 2009) 
